By RICARDO SALUDO
What does the Philippines aim to get out of its territorial tussles with China?
In crafting the right strategy on the South China Sea, the starting point has to be the strategic goals which all aspects of governance, national security and foreign policy included, should advance. These overarching objectives must guide how we deal with Beijing and any other powers involved in the escalating maritime tensions.
Three paramount goals are the most directly affected by the test of wills with China: national security and sovereignty, economic progress, and harmonious foreign relations. All three are not only of prime importance, but also interrelated: problems in one area may cause difficulties in others: witness the trade and tourism fallout from rising China tensions since 2010.
So the key question on the Aquino administration’s China policy is whether it advances those three goals, and what can be done to make it more conducive to the Philippines’ security, development and global stature. Sadly, as this article will argue, the current combative strategy actually harms rather than helps the Philippines, even in security and sovereignty.
On security, the Philippines has gone from having little or no conflicts with China over the past decade, plus the beginnings of maritime collaboration with the 2007 China-Philippines-Vietnam seismic survey, to armed standoffs in Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands. With these incidents, President Benigno Aquino 3rd has turned to America for help. But that spawned more security concerns: with U.S. warships and submarines able to nuke China now deployed in and around the archipelago, the Philippines has become a strategic threat and target for the People’s Liberation Army.
No wonder the PLA has reportedly moved a ballistic missile brigade to the south, covering all of the Philippines and the entire South China Sea, to counter strategic threats there. Besides launching cruise missiles from the Philippines, American forces could interdict shipping in the South China Sea, including 80 percent of China’s oil imports. Hence, Beijing announced plans for a military garrison in the Spratlys, from which its navy would be better able to protect Chinese cargo vessels from interdiction.
As for sovereignty, the President and the government’s loud protestations against China seem to assert territorial claims more forcefully. But in fact, legal efforts to advance the Philippine position remain stalled, while at sea China seems in possession with maritime surveillance vessels holding Scarborough Shoal. Thus, the Philippine claim now is much less tenable than before, when there were no Chinese ships stationed in the disputed shoal, and the joint seismic survey implied some recognition of the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Moreover, good relations and the seismic survey with China at the time afforded the Philippines some leverage to protest incursions. Now, the Philippines is seen not only as a maritime adversary, but also as a US ally hosting its nuclear-armed forces and trying to turn Southeast Asia against China. The reported order empowering Chinese vessels to board and search ships in its claimed waters, if confirmed, show that there would be no more niceties from Beijing.
How can this strategy be fixed? First, the Philippines should join Asean in resuming discussions with China on the draft Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Beijing was even hosting discussions until President Aquino called on the grouping in April to agree on its draft first before talking with the Chinese again. With the new Beijing leadership, it may be possible to resume negotiations with urgency for a final pact.
Secondly, China and the Philippines can move away from confrontation and toward cooperation by downplaying territorial issues and resuming discussions on joint exploration in the South China Sea. That was taken up during President Aquino’s visit in August last year, but never heard of again after he went to the US the following month. Notably, the American Embassy publicly criticized the 2007 seismic survey, prompting then President Gloria Arroyo to complain to her counterpart George W. Bush.
Lastly, rather than relying on the US Navy to secure island claims and economic zones, the Philippines should urgently acquire boats, planes and helicopters with anti-ship missiles. These may be leased first, then purchased over time, with training to operate the anti-access, anti-denial (A2AD) systems.
Without posing nuclear threats to China, such firepower would make nations think twice about encroaching on Philippine waters. And if Beijing pressures countries not to provide A2AD weaponry, it should be told that the alternative would be the status quo of the Seventh Fleet prowling in and near the archipelago within missile-range of Chinese cities, PLA bases, and oil tankers in the South China Sea.
If Aquino makes that China policy shift, then the Philippines wouldn’t have to endure estrangement from the world’s leading growth engine in the coming half-century, as Cuba suffered for almost hosting Soviet missiles and fomenting uprisings in opposition to America, the past half-century’s global economic driver. Nor would Beijing have reason to use its burgeoning international clout against Manila. And South China Sea resources may actually be harnessed, instead of lying idle as investors hold back for fear of conflict.
What about Washington? If Beijing and Manila make peace, Asia may see less need for American forces and alliances —the foundations of US power and influence.
Geopolitics: It’s more fun in the Philippines.
Ricardo Saludo serves Bahay ng Diyos Foundation for church repair. He heads the Center for Strategy, Enterprise & Intelligence, publisher of The CenSEI Report on national and global issues (report@censeisolutions.com).
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