It is ironic and significant that the very first section of Article XI, which spells out the cardinal principle of “accountability of public officers,” and created the independent office of the Ombudsman, declaratively states:
“Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.”
It is useful to recall these words, because they are the standard against which the case of dismissed Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur Carandang should be judged. And it was evidently because his official conduct has been wanting of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and justice that he has now been stripped of a position in public service.
Let’s turn next to the issue whether President Rodrigo Duterte has the authority to dismiss Carandang as deputy ombudsman.
The President’s appointing power is explicitly provided for by Section 16, Article VII, which reads: the president shall nominate, and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. He shall also appoint all other officers of the government, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law…
Carandang falls within the category of other officials of the government.
It is a sound principle in a presidential government that complementing the appointment power, and fundamental to presidential control of the executive branch, is the removal power of the President.
In the words of one political scientist, “without the ability to remove subordinate officials on performance or policy grounds, presidents cannot be held fully responsible for their actions or for their department’s or agency’s failure to achieve presidential objectives.”
In a precedent-setting decision, the US Supreme Court held that the Constitution gave the President the removal power, and that Congress could not place restrictions on its exercise. But the court also said that the President’s unqualified power of removal is limited to purely executive offices.
The final question that the public should address is whether Carandang has been stripped of his office.
Former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales could have helped prevent this case from reaching this awkward pass, had she acted sensibly and not protected Carandang when the Office of the President earlier ordered his suspension. By boastfully defying the suspension order, Morales made this final order of dismissal inevitable.
Our constitutional system is not so daft that a deputy graft prosecutor can accuse publicly the President and his family of graft and unexplained wealth without providing the merest evidence and yet totally escape responsibility. His purported evidence could be publicly shattered by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), and yet a partisan ombudsman could protect him instead.
Our system is not so unbalanced that when the President, invoking his removal power over executive officials, decides to fire Carandang, and his action can now be effectively challenged before the judiciary on the grounds of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion.
Reason, and the law, should prevail. We believe our constitutional system is much better and more coherent than these hypotheticals suggest.
We think it would be good for Carandang and his defenders in the opposition to challenge his dismissal in court. A court decision, especially a Supreme Court decision, will end this farce.
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