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Friday, January 28, 2011

Three (3) basic advantages of the unicameral parliamentary system

The proposed unicameral parliamentary system has three (3) basic advantages over the present bicameral presidential system. Firstly, it avoids the institutional gridlock and duplication of functions between the Senate and the House of Representatives, by merging the Senate with the House of Representatives, which will be the unicameral Congress. Secondly, it avoids the institutional gridlock between Congress and the President, by merging the President with Congress, which will be the Parliament. Thirdly, it eliminates the bias for “rich” and “famous” candidates, by replacing direct national elections for President and the Senators, with indirect elections for President and regional elections for Regional Representatives (replacing Senators), local elections for District Representatives, and sectoral elections for Sectoral Representatives.

(1) The present bicameral system allows an institutional gridlock between the Senate and the House of Representatives, because the bifurcated organizational structure and divergent selection processes involved, open the upper and lower chambers to control by opposing political parties.

On the other hand, the proposed unicameral system bars any institutional gridlock, because the Senate will be merged with the House of Representatives, which will be the unicameral Congress. Thus, the party that assumes majority control of Congress, assumes undivided legislative powers.

While the minority party retains the power to check the excesses of the majority party, it loses the power to obstruct the majority party’s legislative agenda.

Notably, the law making process essentially involves the same methodology, resource persons, information materials and national interest. This is so regardless of whether the proponent is the Senate or the House of Representatives. Thus, under the bicameral system, there will always be duplication of the law making process necessarily resulting in the wastage of public funds.

(2) The present presidential system allows an institutional gridlock between Congress and the President, because the separated organizational structure and independent selection processes involved, open the legislative and executive branches to control by opposing political parties.

On the other hand, the proposed parliamentary system bars any institutional gridlock, because the President will be merged with Congress, which will be the Parliament. Thus, the party that assumes majority control of the Parliament, also assumes the power to elect the chief executive.

While the minority party retains the power to check the excesses of the majority party, it loses the power to obstruct the majority party’s administration of government programs.

(3) The present election system for President and the Senators is inherently biased for “rich” and “famous” candidates, because the selection process involves direct national elections at large. The “rich” candidates are those who can afford to spend billions to campaign and make themselves known to the Filipino voters nationwide. The “famous” candidates are the entertainment, sports and media celebrities who no longer need not campaign nationwide because they are already known to the Filipino voters at large. “Rich” and “famous” candidates thrive best in direct national elections at large where popularity generally takes precedence over performance.

On the other hand, the proposed system of indirect elections eliminates this bias, because in the context of local, regional and sectoral elections, “fame” and “fortune” generally do not carry as much weight as actual track records of public service. Thus, the proposed system promotes fair democratic elections by effectively expanding the roster of winnable candidates for national positions.

Notably, the combined regional elections for Regional Representatives (replacing Senators), local elections for District Representatives, and sectoral elections for Sectoral Representatives, also serve as the indirect national elections for chief executive. This is because the party that assumes majority control of the unicameral Parliament, also assumes the power to elect the chief executive. Therefore, there is no undue curtailment of the right of suffrage, because the voter is free to consider the party’s known choice for chief executive, when voting for Regional Representatives, District Representatives, and Sectoral Representatives.

This article was written ex-gratia by Demosthenes B. Donato for the We Citizen Advocates for Reforms Movement (We Care), Inc. (Kilusan ng Mamamayang Nagmamalasakit sa Bayan). All intellectual property rights are granted to the public domain.

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Tatlong (3) Pangunahing Kapakinabangan ng Sistemang Parlamentong Unikameral


Ang panukalang parlamentong unikameral ay may tatlong pangunahing kapakinabangan kaysa sa kasalukuyang pampresidenteng bikameral. Una, naiiwasan nito ang hidwaang institusyonal at duplikasyon ng mga tungkulin sa pagitan ng Senado at Mababang Kapulungan, sa pamamagitan ng pagsanib ng Senado sa Mababang Kapulungan, na magiging Kongresong unikameral. Pangalawa, naiiwasan nito ang hidwaang institusyonal sa pagitan ng Kongreso at Presidente, sa pamamagitan ng pagsanib ng Presidente sa Kongreso, na magiging Parlamento. Pangatlo, tinatanggal nito ang pagkiling sa mga “sikat” at “mayamang” kandidato, sa pamamagitan ng pag-palit ng direktang pambansang halalan sa Presidente at mga Senador, at sa halip ay di direktang pambansang halalan sa Presidente at halalang pang-rehiyon para Representante ng Rehiyon (kapalit ang mga Senador), halalang local para Representante ng Distrito, at halalang sektoral para sa Representanteng Sektoral.

(1) Sa kasalukuyang sistemang bicameral pinapahintulutan ang hidwaang institusyonal sa pagitan ng Senado at Mababang Kapulungan, dahil ang pinagbiyak na istruktura ng organisasyon at magkaibang proseso ng pagpili ng kinatawan nito, ay nagpapahintulot na pangasiwaan ang mataas at mababang kapulungan ng magkakasalungat na partido politikal.

Sa kabilang dako, sa panukalang sistemang unikameral di pinapahintulutan ang hidwaang institusyonal na ito, sa dahilang pagsasanibin ang Senado sa Mababang Kapulungan, na magiging Kongresong unikameral. Kaya, ang partidong magiging mayorya sa Kongreso, ay magkakaroon ng di-nahahating kapangyarihang tagapagbatas.

Bagamat mananatili sa minorya ang kapangyarihang suriin ang kalabisan ng mayorya, mawawala sa minorya ang kapangyirang sirain ang programang pambatas ng mayorya.

Kapansin-pansin na ang proseso sa paggawa ng batas ay nauugnay sa iisang pamamaraan, pagbabatayang tao, kagamitang pang-impormasyon, at pambansang interes. Totoo ito, kahit sinuman ang tagapagtaguyod, maging ang Senado o Mababang Kapulungan. Kaya, sa sistemang bicameral, palaging nagkakaroon ng duplikasyon ng proseso sa paggawa ng batas na tiyak na nau-uwi sa pag-aaksaya ng pondong publiko.

(2) Sa kasalukuyang sistemang pampresidente pinapahintulutan ang hidwaang institusyonal sa pagitan ng Kongreso at Presidente, dahil ang pinaghiwalay na istruktura ng organisasyon at magkasariling proseso ng pagpili ng kinatawan nito, ay nagpapahintulot na pangasiwaan ang sangay tagapagbatas at tagapagpaganap ng magkakasalungat na partido politikal.

Sa kabilang dako, sa panukalang sistemang parlamento di pinapahintulutan ang hidwaang instistusyonal na ito, sa dahilang pagsasanibin ang Presidente sa Kongreso, na magiging Parlamento. Kaugnay nito, ang partidong magiging mayorya sa Parlamento, ay magkakaroon din ng kapangyarihang maghalal ng punong tagapagpaganap.

Bagamat nananatili sa minorya ang kapangyarihang suriin ang kalabisan ng mayorya, mawawala sa minorya ang kapangyarihang sirain ang pagpapatupad ng mayorya ng programang pamahalaan.

(3) Sa kasalukuyang sistemang halalan sa Presidente at mga Senador, may likas na pagkiling sa mga “sikat” at “mayamang” kandidato, dahil ang proseso ay direktang pambansang halalan. Ang mga “mayamang” kandidato ay iyong may kakayahang gumasta ng bilyones sa pangangampanya upang makilala ng mga botanteng Pilipino sa buong bansa. Ang mga “sikat” na kandidato ay iyong mga tanyag sa larangan ng entertainment, isports at media, na hindi na kailangan pang mangampanya dahil kilala na sila ng mga botanteng Pilipino. Ang mga “sikat” at “mayamang” kandidato ay higit na nagtatagumpay sa sistema ng direktang pambansang halalan, kung saan pangkaraniwang nangunguna ang kasikatan kaysa sa paggawa.

Sa kabilang dako, tinatanggal ng panukalang sistemang di direktang halalan ang ganitong pagkiling, sa dahilang sa halalang lokal, pang-rehiyon at sektoral, ang “kasikatan” at “kayaman”, ay pangkaraniwang wala gaanong halaga kung ihahambing sa tunay na tala ng serbisyong pampubliko. Kaya, pinapalakas nito ang pantay-pantay na demokratikong halalan sa mabisang pagpapalawak ng talaan ng mga kandidatong may kakayahang manalo sa mga pambansang katungkulan.

Kapansin-pansin na ang pinagsamang halalang pang-rehiyon para Representante ng Rehiyon (kapalit ang mga Senador), halalang lokal para Representante ng Distrito, at halalang sektoral para Represenanteng Sektoral, ay nagsisilbi din ng di direktang halalan sa punong tagapagpaganap. Totoo ito, dahil ang partidong magiging mayorya sa Parlamentong unikameral, ang magkakaroon din ng kapangyarihang maghalal ng punong tagapagpaganap. Dahil dito, walang nagaganap na pagsupil sa karapatang pagboto, dahil ang botante ay malayang gamitin bilang batayan ang kilalang kandidato ng partido sa pagka-punong tagapagpaganap, kapag bumoto siya para sa mga Representante ng Rehiyon, Representante ng Distrito, at Representanteng Sektoral.

Ang artikulong ito ay sinulat na ex-gratia ni Demosthenes B. Donato para sa We Citizen Advocates for Reforms Movement (We Care), Inc. (Kilusan ng Mamamayang Nagmamalasakit sa Bayan). Ang lahat ng intellectual property rights ay binibigay sa public domain.

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About the Author

Dodong aka Ka Kiko has written 8 stories on this site.


4 Comments on “Three (3) basic advantages of the unicameral parliamentary system”

  • The Lazzo wrote on 26 January, 2011, 3:17

    George Washington, when asked by Thomas Jefferson why he would have two houses of congress in the United States similar to the British Parliament’s Houses of Lords & Commons, likened it to pouring tea in a saucer. The cooled tea in the saucer would help cool down the tea in the teacup, a metaphor for the more passionate and often more populist legislation that arises from the lower house to “cool off” when reaching the upper house.

    Indeed, with the Philippines and its current (and often uneducated) populist tendencies, perhaps reducing the government to one house might result in simply removing the barriers for those tendencies.

    That’s not to defend the current system, of course. As mentioned in your first thread, parliaments can also be bicameral as used in Britain, or for a closer example, our ASEAN neighbors Thailand. The often-touted example of Singapore could manage a unicameral system primarily due to its small size requiring only a small system. Its parent country Malaysia uses a bicameral system.

    For point 3:

    The key word is generally.

    Since many powerful ‘families’ are generally in control of their regions, it wouldn’t be hard for a member of that family – or at least one that can earn that family’s endorsement and support, to take that seat regardless of their ‘track record of public service.’ This is especially true in places where those families are quite literally the only ones with an actual record of public service. Newcomers against those families will still have little chance of gaining a higher seat.

    What is needed in that case is electoral reform within whatever system is used (such as rigidly-enforced spending limits?) to ensure that newcomers will have a fighting chance against the ruling elites of that area.

    [Reply]

  • Dodong aka Ka Kiko wrote on 26 January, 2011, 5:21

    Hi Lazzo. Thanks for your comments. Here are some observations.

    1. I believe that the reasoning of George Washington follows the traditional justification for bicameral legislatures, where one house is for the commoners, and another house for the artistocracy. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bicameralism. Personally, I’m not so comfortable with this justification based on the difference in social status and perceived state of mind. Anyway, in another article I posted earlier entitled American Bicameralism, the wikipedia source tells of another reason, that the senate is based on the legal theory of equality between the states, while the house is based on population. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Congress.

    The origin and rational aside, I also note what I believe is a critical difference between the US and Phil systems. In the US, the federal senators also come from the regions (or component states). They are not elected directly at large nationwide. Thus, their regional (sub-state) constituents are closer to the local constituents of the Congressmen. I would take this to mean that their views and interests will not be too far from each other. In the Phil however, our senators are elected nationwide at large. They do not answer to any specific area or sectoral constituency. Moreover, I observe that they are very sensitive to populist issues highlighted by media. This is probably because the selection process for senators is almost purely popularity or media based. Thus, it would seem that in the Phil, the Senators elected at large are more sensitive to populist issues, as compared to local or sectoral representatives.

    One possible solution would be to change the constituency of senators from national to regional. Assuming that the majority of the electorate would still prefer a bicameral structure for “checks and balances”, then changing the constituency would at least be an improvement over what we have now.

    BTW, in parliaments with bicameral structures, the lower house is generally more powerful than the upper house. Please see UK and Japan. Thus, the PM always comes from the lower house. It also has greater legislative powers.

    2. Personally, I’m not against tycoons running for office. I accept that all citizens are entitled to run for office and would not take that right away from them. What I’m against are the rules which practically say they are the only ones entitled to run office. This is how I see and interpret the present constitutional provisions providing for nationwide elections at large for president (and senators). It’s like everybody else has no real alternative choice, except to choose from among those who can afford nationwide elections at large. I suppose there are only very few of them in our country today.

    By bringing down the selection process to those from the regions, we can make the pool of candidates substantially bigger. By going further and bring down the selection process to the districts, then that would even be bigger. Definitely, it will not be a perfect solution. However, I believe it will be a major improvement. Almost similar to changing the constituency of senators from national to regional.

    As for other electoral reforms to support changes in the rules of selection, yes of course I agree and acknowledge they are needed. However, I have no specifics at the moment as they already involve the implementing mechanics of law reform (election code), and no longer constitutional reform.

    [Reply]

  • Hyden Toro wrote on 26 January, 2011, 12:04

    I believe our system of government needs upgrading to remove: (1) Political warlords. (2) Oligarch’s control of the political system. (3) Media/news manipulation of the people who control the government. (4) Party in power, making government positions as cash cows. (5) Effective ways of kicking-out incumbent rulers, if they deceive voters, and will not perform to give effective results. (6) Promotes cooperation of all parties, to work for the common good.

    [Reply]

    The Lazzo Reply:
    January 26th, 2011 at 12:24 pm

    The interesting thing is that some of the Asian success stories come from countries with restrictions on foreign media investment that are very strict (not quite 0% like ours, but you get the idea.)

    http://iab.worldbank.org/Data/Explore%20Topics/Investing-across-sectors/Media
    Check out Singapore and South Korea as well as Japan’s TV networks (gotta protect their precious animoo from filthy gaijin penetration.)

    Perhaps this could actually work to AP’s advantage. Because AP is mostly by Filipinos, it wouldn’t exactly be breaking any laws (raising eyebrows and tempers, sure, but not breaking laws) to have AP establish a presence into Filipino mainstream media, would it?

    [Reply]


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