RAPPLER actually had a point when Pia Ranada said that honesty in public service was enshrined in Section 27 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution: “The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.” But what made their argument fall flat on its face was in its being driven by their usual partisan flavor which once again spoiled what could have been a powerful point had it been cast as fair assertion, and not to quarrel with Sara Duterte. They missed realizing that the Constitution was actually referring to honesty and integrity in relation to public service, and not in a generic sense. This is precisely why the clause forms part of a provision that also talked about graft and corruption.
Certainly, public officials are enjoined by the Constitution to uphold honesty and integrity in the performance of their duties, but it is nowhere required that generic honesty, nor even integrity, is a requirement to run for office. This may be an unpalatable statement, but that is a fact. It may sound offensive to the virtuous and the morally upright, but that is the way it is. Ranada and Rappler, in their earnest desire to troll Sara Duterte for her statement that all politicians lie, and that honesty is not a requirement to run, tried to impose their interpretation of a general principle to be upheld by public servants, as a specific requirement for public office.
The truth of the matter is this. Sara Duterte simply called the elephant in the room. And it is not even a brazen admission of something that is morally unpalatable.
In fact, it is something that draws its logic, unknown to most people, from philosophy and political theory.
Politics has not always existed as something that must be absolutely practiced with virtue. British political scientist Sir Bernard Crick, who argued that politics is ethics done in public, in his enumeration of the political virtues in In Defense of Politics, did not consider honesty and integrity as important enough to be articulated and included in his list. He enumerated prudence (careful evaluation of results of prior steps before making the next move), conciliation (being friendly even with people with whom one has disagreement), compromise (giving up some things valued to get other things that are more valued), variety (offering diverse options, and celebrating diversity), adaptability (readiness to adjust to changing times) and liveliness (enabling a positive atmosphere). Had honesty and integrity been important for Crick, he would not have left this out in the list and would not have simply relegated it to those others that can be implied as additional virtues.
Even some notable virtue ethicists, like Rosalind Hursthouse, deny honesty its absolute meaning outside the context of the totality of one’s persona. Hursthouse argued that “a virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a ‘desirable’ or ‘morally valuable’ character trait. It is, indeed, a character trait…but the disposition in question, far from being a single-track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-track.” She elaborated further, asserting that virtue “is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of a person with a certain complex mindset.” Hursthouse thus argued against an absolute, single-dimensional construct of virtue like honesty; she even called the act of attributing virtue on the basis of a single action as an extreme form of recklessness. It can be deduced from this that such recklessness would also be true in attributing total dishonesty on a single lie.
Aristotle has contributed a lot to the philosophy of virtue in relation to politics. He specifically listed truthfulness as one important moral virtue, in addition to wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance, among others. However, Aristotle couched this in the context of the polis. Virtue ethics for Aristotle is found in the exercise of politics where the telos is to find meaning in relation to the very end of the polis itself, which is to enable human beings to flourish, or what is referred to as eudaimonia. Virtue, when defined and operationalized in the context of political practice, is a habit or quality that allows those who possess it to succeed in relation to their purposes or telos. In current practice, this can then be interpreted as the pursuit of the public good, and that the virtue of politics is for its agents to be able to serve the interest of the greatest number of people.
The current preoccupation with virtue as good moral character and total honesty as requirements for public office is mainly drawn from the classical republicanism forwarded by Tacitus, where he feared that power and luxury could corrupt individuals and undermine liberty. Hence, for Tacitus, virtue is a necessary shield against corruption that threatens the Republic.
Whereas Aristotle would have focused on the platforms and track records of candidates as the main basis for judging their political virtues, Tacitus would have dwelt on their lies and dishonesty to imply that they do not possess integrity, and as such would be unfit to serve the Republic. Aristotle talked about serving the polis as the virtue of politics, while Tacitus talked about virtue as a prerequisite for politics. Thus, Aristotle talked about public service as virtue, while Tacitus imaged public servants to be devoid of vices. We now know that Ranada, Rappler and Robredo, and the moralist crowd are modern-day incarnations of Tacitus.
https://www.manilatimes.net/virtue-politics-and-political-philosophy/524347/
Certainly, public officials are enjoined by the Constitution to uphold honesty and integrity in the performance of their duties, but it is nowhere required that generic honesty, nor even integrity, is a requirement to run for office. This may be an unpalatable statement, but that is a fact. It may sound offensive to the virtuous and the morally upright, but that is the way it is. Ranada and Rappler, in their earnest desire to troll Sara Duterte for her statement that all politicians lie, and that honesty is not a requirement to run, tried to impose their interpretation of a general principle to be upheld by public servants, as a specific requirement for public office.
The truth of the matter is this. Sara Duterte simply called the elephant in the room. And it is not even a brazen admission of something that is morally unpalatable.
In fact, it is something that draws its logic, unknown to most people, from philosophy and political theory.
Politics has not always existed as something that must be absolutely practiced with virtue. British political scientist Sir Bernard Crick, who argued that politics is ethics done in public, in his enumeration of the political virtues in In Defense of Politics, did not consider honesty and integrity as important enough to be articulated and included in his list. He enumerated prudence (careful evaluation of results of prior steps before making the next move), conciliation (being friendly even with people with whom one has disagreement), compromise (giving up some things valued to get other things that are more valued), variety (offering diverse options, and celebrating diversity), adaptability (readiness to adjust to changing times) and liveliness (enabling a positive atmosphere). Had honesty and integrity been important for Crick, he would not have left this out in the list and would not have simply relegated it to those others that can be implied as additional virtues.
Even some notable virtue ethicists, like Rosalind Hursthouse, deny honesty its absolute meaning outside the context of the totality of one’s persona. Hursthouse argued that “a virtue such as honesty or generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it to be helpfully specified as a ‘desirable’ or ‘morally valuable’ character trait. It is, indeed, a character trait…but the disposition in question, far from being a single-track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-track.” She elaborated further, asserting that virtue “is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of a person with a certain complex mindset.” Hursthouse thus argued against an absolute, single-dimensional construct of virtue like honesty; she even called the act of attributing virtue on the basis of a single action as an extreme form of recklessness. It can be deduced from this that such recklessness would also be true in attributing total dishonesty on a single lie.
Aristotle has contributed a lot to the philosophy of virtue in relation to politics. He specifically listed truthfulness as one important moral virtue, in addition to wisdom, justice, fortitude and temperance, among others. However, Aristotle couched this in the context of the polis. Virtue ethics for Aristotle is found in the exercise of politics where the telos is to find meaning in relation to the very end of the polis itself, which is to enable human beings to flourish, or what is referred to as eudaimonia. Virtue, when defined and operationalized in the context of political practice, is a habit or quality that allows those who possess it to succeed in relation to their purposes or telos. In current practice, this can then be interpreted as the pursuit of the public good, and that the virtue of politics is for its agents to be able to serve the interest of the greatest number of people.
The current preoccupation with virtue as good moral character and total honesty as requirements for public office is mainly drawn from the classical republicanism forwarded by Tacitus, where he feared that power and luxury could corrupt individuals and undermine liberty. Hence, for Tacitus, virtue is a necessary shield against corruption that threatens the Republic.
Whereas Aristotle would have focused on the platforms and track records of candidates as the main basis for judging their political virtues, Tacitus would have dwelt on their lies and dishonesty to imply that they do not possess integrity, and as such would be unfit to serve the Republic. Aristotle talked about serving the polis as the virtue of politics, while Tacitus talked about virtue as a prerequisite for politics. Thus, Aristotle talked about public service as virtue, while Tacitus imaged public servants to be devoid of vices. We now know that Ranada, Rappler and Robredo, and the moralist crowd are modern-day incarnations of Tacitus.
https://www.manilatimes.net/virtue-politics-and-political-philosophy/524347/
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