The budget crisis appears to be happening because we have members of Congress who ignored the ruling of the Supreme Court. This is magnified by a Constitution that talks of a bicameral Congress, but is still haunted by the ghosts of the initial intent of its framers to have a unicameral one. It appears that there was a failure to reconcile some of the important provisions for consistency.
The Supreme Court, when it declared the unconstitutionality of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) through a ruling penned by Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe in 2013, clearly reinforced the constitutional principle of separation of powers, where only Congress can appropriate government funds through legislation, and that the Executive branch cannot legislate. Similarly, members of Congress cannot participate in post-enactment implementation of the budget, by actively engaging in identifying projects, as this is solely lodged in the Executive branch. One of the consequences of this is that Congress must discontinue its practice of having lump-sum appropriations in the budget. This is because it would amount to the Executive branch being forced to engage in post-enactment itemization of the lump sum which can be construed as a legislative act.
It therefore behooves us to ask why Congress, in its bicameral conference committee report on the 2019 budget which both of its houses ratified, insisted on having lump-sum appropriations contrary to the ruling of the Supreme Court. What further makes the entire process bizarre is that the House of Representatives attempted to cure this infirmity by what its leaders claim as simply an act of itemizing the lump-sum appropriations, thereby making changes in the budget that had already been approved by the bicameral conference committee and ratified by both houses. It is simply odd that the leaders of the House of Representatives would attempt to correct what they see as an unconstitutional provision through a move whose constitutionality can also be challenged.
The senators are challenging the constitutionality of this move by the House of Representatives by citing Section 26 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution, which states that: “No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and the nays entered in the Journal.”
The Supreme Court in GR 168056 promulgated in 2005 ruled, however, that Section 26 (2) refers only “to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment.” It further ruled that “to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill.”
While the Constitution does not explicitly state the existence of the bicameral conference committee, the SC through GR 168056 has recognized its constitutionality and even granted it the power to further introduce amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress.
What is not clear, however, is if any of the houses can still change the content of a reconciled bill that has already been passed by the bicameral conference committee and ratified by both houses, which the House has done. The House has also alleged that the Senate also introduced changes by similarly itemizing lump-sum appropriations, which the senators deny.
The Constitution and GR 168056 are both silent on this issue.
The only constitutional provision where relationships between the two houses are explicitly specified in the context of legislation is in Section 27 (1) which is about overriding a presidential veto. Here, the Constitution clearly states that the house from where the bill originated first votes to override, after which it is then transmitted to the other house. Considering therefore that both houses need to hurdle a two-thirds minimum vote threshold to override, what is unknown to many — maybe because we have not seen a veto override since the passage of the Constitution — is that the originating House has in fact a filtering power in that if it fails or refuses to override a presidential veto, then there is no need for the other house to vote.
So, here is where we are. Congress has passed a budget that contains lump-sum appropriations that will then force the hand of the President to implement only by making additional itemization which may be construed as contrary to the PDAF ruling of the Supreme Court. The House tried to cure this, but by making a move that has disturbed one of the traditions of Congress as a bicameral body, which upon closer scrutiny may in fact be one whose constitutionality is also assailable. And what heightens the conundrum is that the Constitution is in itself vague, and there is no existing jurisprudence on the matter.
And the fact that we are now forced to operate on a reenacted budget, in an election year, makes the scenario, frankly, a bit worrisome. It doesn’t just undermine government operations and seriously impair growth projections, it also heightens the sense of political uncertainty.
https://www.manilatimes.net/budget-crisis-could-turn-into-a-constitutional-conundrum/526462/
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