IT appears that the problem concerning the early release of prisoners convicted of heinous crimes, like Antonio Sanchez, is rooted in the law, Republic Act 10592, or the “Good Conduct Time Allowances” (GCTA) Law, having used the wrong words.
The last proviso of Section 1 of RA 10592 reads: “Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act.” Take note that Section 1 talks about people who are under preventive imprisonment, and are not yet convicted.
This is why in the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of RA 10592, it is alleged that the exceptions mentioned only apply in computing the GCTA of convicted felons credited during the period of their preventive imprisonment, or that period where they were jailed prior to conviction. That is, the length of this entire period will not be considered in computing their GCTA. I tried googling for the IRR of RA 10592 but it is not available online, and I am basing this only from news reports where officials of the Bureau of Corrections have reportedly made that claim.
Indeed, it is clear that the proviso appears in a section of the law specifically covering preventive imprisonment. And in addition, the enumeration of the possible exceptions under Section 1 includes recidivists and habitual delinquents, which would apply to people who are under preventive imprisonment and charged for committing a felony awaiting a court decision but who have records of previous conviction either for a different or a similar crime. And furthermore, the wording clearly states that what is not covered are people “charged with heinous crimes” and does not mention people who are “convicted of heinous crimes.”
But what complicates the issue is that the words used in Section 1 say that those who fall under the enumerated cases, including those charged with heinous crimes, are “excluded from the coverage of this Act” which by logic refer to RA 10592, and not just to Section 1. This then invites an interpretation where one can effectively argue that those enumerated are not covered to benefit from the GCTA, and not just Section 1.
So, the issue here is whether people who are convicted of heinous crimes would be excluded to benefit from the GCTA Law. And we are facing this conundrum simply because of the flawed and vague manner in which the provisions of this law has been worded.
Certainly, one can argue that if persons merely charged of heinous crimes would no longer benefit from the GCTA during the period of their preventive imprisonment, it is logical to expect that they should not benefit from it during the entire period of their incarceration once convicted. Unfortunately, while it is a logical conclusion, it becomes problematic when we consider the varying severity of the exclusions in Section 1.
If we interpret that people convicted of heinous crimes are no longer eligible to benefit from the law, then it also implies that people with records of recidivism, habitual delinquency and escape prior to conviction of another crime, after already serving their sentences thereon, would also no longer benefit from GCTA, even if they have exhibited evidence of good conduct. In other words, we will be treating recidivism and habitual delinquency, or escape, even in relation to lower offenses, as equivalent to heinous crimes. That is, a person convicted twice of petty theft, or a journalist convicted of libel twice in a row, would now be put in the same category as Antonio Sanchez who was convicted of rape and double murder.
In addition, the legal landscape in the country favors putting a cap on the length of imprisonment, despite multiple penalties. When these penalties cannot be served simultaneously, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code sets a maximum period one can be imprisoned. Under its “three-fold rule,” a convict can be punished only up to three times the most severe penalty, but not to exceed 40 years. This firmly establishes a legal culture that prefers reform, and that looks kindly on the rights even of the convicted. In fact, the most recent decision of the Supreme Court relating to the implementation of RA 10592 ruled that its application must be retroactive to favor persons guilty of a felony “although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”
In the midst of this confusion, the only valid remedy to settle the issue is to run to the Supreme Court and seek for the proper interpretation on whether the exclusions enumerated in Section 1 of RA 10592, particularly those related to heinous crimes, apply only to people charged for committing it and who are preventively imprisoned, or extends even to those who are convicted and are already serving their sentences. It is likely that the court will go back to the deliberations in Congress to help them divine the intent of the framers of the law.
Another remedy is for Congress to amend RA 10592 and make explicit that people convicted of heinous crimes will not benefit, and amend the Revised Penal Code to ensure that they will be imprisoned for the rest of their lives. But this may not apply to people like Sanchez anymore considering the principle of non-retroactive application of laws if it works against the interest of convicts.
In the final analysis, the problem that we are facing now could have been avoided had Congress practiced due diligence. This is not the first time that vaguely or wrongly worded provisions have appeared in our laws. It is now a wake-up call for senators and representatives to take extra measures to ensure clarity, preciseness completeness and consistency in the writing of our laws. After all, an incorrect or missing word could lead to a bigger problem like what we are facing right now.
https://www.manilatimes.net/2019/09/03/opinion/columnists/topanalysis/when-wrong-words-lead-to-a-sanchez-problem/610094/
No comments:
Post a Comment